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CASE NOTES
held a building contractor liable for injuries sustained when a porch fell on
the tenant of the grantee two years after construction of the house. 24 One
factor present in all the cases representing the "new" or "modern" view of
liability without privity is that the defect was latent and not patent. Ob-
servation of a defect upon reasonable inspection would seem to be sufficient
basis for shifting the liability from the contractor to the owner of the
structure.
The overwhelming majority of cases of the type under discussion have
involved personal injury. However, in the instant case the injury complained
of is property damage, and the court properly ruled that the principle of law
should be the same as it is for personal injury. In Central & So. Truck Lines
v. Westfall GMC Truck, Inc.,25 liability for property damage was imposed
for negligent repairs to plaintiff's trailer, despite lack of privity, and a New
Jersey court28 recently imposed liability upon a negligent repairman for both
personal injuries and property damage. The sound view calls for the exten-
sion of liability to cases involving property damage as has been done in the
area of manufacturer's liability.27
It is submitted that this case represents the sound view of negligence
liability for building contractors. There is no logical reason for applying
one rule of law to building contractors and another rule with a broader liabil-
ity to manufacturers, suppliers of chattels, and repairers and rebuilders.
Building contractors should be subject to the duty of reasonable care for
the protection of anyone who may foreseeably be endangered by their negli-
gence, even after acceptance of the work by the owner.
THOMAS J. GALLAGHER, JR.
Trade Regulations—Restraint of Trade—Boycott of Doctor Excluded
from County Medical Bureau.—Hubbard v. Medical Service Corpora-
tion of Spokane County. 1—Appellant doctor was a member of The Medical
Service Bureau of Spokane County, an unincorporated association of which
275 of the 300 doctors licensed to practice in the county were members. The
sole function of the bureau was to make medical and surgical services
available to The Medical Service Corporation of Spokane County, a non-
profit organization, by means of individual contracts executed by members
of the bureau and the corporation. In turn, the corporation had agreements
with various employee groups to supply these services in return for prepaid
premiums. Like all other bureau members, appellant doctor entered into a
contract with the corporation when he became a bureau member, whereby
he agreed to treat all subscribers to the prepaid medical plan, to accept as
payment in full the fees established by the bureau and approved by the
24 Leigh v. Wadsworth, 361 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1961).
25 317 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. App. 1958).
29 Zierer v. Daniels, 40 N.J. Super. 130, 122 A.2(1 377 (1956).
27 Prosser, Torts 501 (2d ed. 1955), citing International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff,
202 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1953) ; Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App, Div. 433, 153
N.Y. Supp. 131 (1915).
I — Wash. 2d —, 367 P.2d 1003 (1962).
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corporation, and to abide by the rules and regulations covering the furnishing
of his services. Furthermore, the contract was made subject to cancellation
at any time without cause. Among the more pertinent bureau rules to which
appellant was subject are the following: a member doctor cannot associate
professionally with, or refer subscribers to a non-member doctor, nor can
he make a contract for his services in any competing prepaid contract medical
plan; except for routine office calls, all treatment must be approved in
advance by the bureau; and all charges made are subject to review. Because
appellant charged subscriber patients a higher fee for certain special treat-
ments than was fixed by the bureau, thereby violating the regulation against
"double billing," his contract with the corporation was cancelled, and his
membership in the bureau automatically terminated. Appellant sought both
damages and injunctive relief against both the corporation and the bureau.
HELD: Although the corporation was justified in cancelling the contract,
the bureau's policy of preventing member doctors from referring subscriber
patients to non-member doctors was in restraint of trade and an illegal
boycott. An injunction was issued.
At the outset, it is important to carefully delineate the bounds of the
decision in this case. Clearly, the court did not decide that the whole opera-
tion of the bureau and the corporation amounted to a monopoly? What
it did decide was that it was an illegal boycott and restraint of trade for the
bureau to prohibit member physicians from referring patients to the
appellant, a non-member physicians
Although courts in England and the United States, on both the federal
and the state levels, have occasionally applied anti-monopoly law to certain
practices of medical organizations, the most striking feature of the cases in
this area is the difficulty encountered• by the courts in attempting to force a
traditionally non-commercial activity within a framework of laws which
historically have been applied only to conventional commercial transactions.
Quite expectedly, the result is a stretching of language and a broadening of
concepts.4 Acting as a countervailing force of considerable fortitude is the
2 In a single brief paragraph the court summarily dismissed appellant's allegation
that the operation of the bureau and the corporation constituted a monopoly, stating
that "The evidence supports the finding of the trial court . .. to the effect that the
corporation's operation is not monopolistic in nature, is not in the furtherance of any
monopoly, and does•not fix prices or limit protection, and that its operation is beneficial
rather than injurious' to the general public." Id. at 1006-07.
Two other points were decided. First, the court held that the corporation was
justified in terminating appellant's contract. Second, it determined that appellant
had no identifiable legal interest to challenge certain bureau regulations. These areas
of the decision exceed the scope of this note and, hence, are not discussed.
4
 In every case in which the question of whether or not a particular practice of a
medical organization is in restraint of trade, the court must come to grips with the
meaning of the term "trade." Mr. Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the Court in
The Nymph, 18 Fed. Cas. 506, 507 (No. 10,388) (C.C. D. Me. 1834), defined the word
thus: ". . the word 'trade' is often and indeed, generally used in a broader sense, as
equivalent to occupation, employment, or business, whether manual or mercantile.
Wherever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the purpose of
profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned professions, it is
constantly called a trade." Although this was cited by the United States Supreme Court
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impelling argument of medical organizations that, although some of their
practices may amount to virtual restraints of trade, they are the essential
means of enforcing the high ethical standards of the medical profession. 5
Nevertheless, several courts have piloted their way clear of the Scylla and
Charybdis of adamant legal concepts, conceived in a different age under
different conditions, and of stubborn "ethical" principles, established primarily
to preserve selfish interests.°
The federal courts seem willing to enlarge the provisions of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act to include the prohibition of certain practices of medical
associations which tend to unjustly injure non-members. In a leading case,?
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was con-
fronted with the question of whether or not the practice of a local medical
society of expelling members who joined or consulted with doctors em-
ployed by a cooperative group that competed with the society's prepaid
medical program was a violation of Section 3 of the Sherman Act.° In
in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, as recently as 1932, the
court in United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940)
pointed out that the Court was using this quote as authority for the proposition
that "cleaning and dyeing" are a trade within the meaning of § 3 of the Sherman Act,
and not to show that the professions fall outside the meaning of "trade."
Expressing what is perhaps the more liberal view, Roscoe Steffen, in his article
Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade: The Apex Case, avers: "The bare right to
pursue one's business or calling is fundamental. . . . Trade has to do with buying and
selling, yes, but its basic meaning is the pursuit of a calling. Physicians may not adopt
'rules of ethics,' for example, • to prevent their more venturesome brother-physicians
from charging for their services on a 'contract' basis." 50 Yale L.J. 787, 826 (1941).
5 In a comprehensive article explaining the history and function of the American
Medical Association, the authors stated:
To maintain what it considers the integrity and standing of the profession,
the American Medical Association has established a code of ethics to govern the
behavior of practitioners. . . . Because the AMA has the consent and support
of a great majority of doctors, its standards can often be enforced against an
offender without formal action. The physician who is suspected of 'unethical'
practice may be subjected to professional ostracism. This may involve denial
by member physicians of patient referral and consultations, and the loss of ad-
vancement in hospital and other professional appointments. The American
Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63
Yale L.J. 938, 949 (1954).
6 No imputation against the general lofty aims of organized medicine and the
effectuation of them is suggested. Only those practices tagged by medical associations
as "ethical," but actually motivated by desires to advance the private interests of
member doctors at the expense of non-member doctors are intended. The author whole-
heartedly concurs in the court's statement in United States v. American Medical Ass'n,
supra note 4, at 712: ". . . we are not unmindful of the importance of rules of conduct
in medical practice, rules which can best be made by the profession itself. . . . We also
recognize that in personal conduct and professional skill the rules and canons, so estab-
lished, have aided in raising the standards of medical practice to the advantage of the
whole country."
7 United States v. American Medical Ass'n, supra note 4.
8 Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or the
District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such
Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any
State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between
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arriving at its holding that such a violation had occurred, the court ex-
pounded:
The phrase 'restraint of trade' had its genesis in the common
law, and its legal import and significance is declared again and
again in the decisions of English courts, both before and after the
date of our independence, as well as in American decisions in many
of the states. The Supreme Court has said Congress passed the
Sherman Act with this common law background in mind.° ... the
common law governing restraints of trade has not been confined
. . to the field of commercial activity ordinarily defined as
`trade,' but embraces as well the field of the medical profession. 1 °
(Footnotes added.)
Although this decision represents a landmark in the broad interpretation
of the Sherman Act and is good precedent for a liberal construction of the
legal concept of restraint of trade, it has very little impact upon cases of the
type now under consideration in other federal courts. Here, some involvement
with interstate commerce must first be established, a problem with which the
courts of the District of Columbia are not concerned since, constitutionally,
Congress has plenary power to legislate locally in the District. Consistently,
other federal courts have found no violation of the Sherman Act, usually
because interstate commerce was not involved."
England has not been totally averse to expanding the meaning of the
word "trade" which has gathered the moss of legal definition. An English
court has brought within the proscription of illegal restraint of trade ex-
pulsion by a medical society of a member for engaging in prepaid contract
medicine and thereafter precluding member physicians from consulting with
him. 12
 Furthermore, the court found that the boycott effected in this and
in other ways was intended to increase the area of practice and financial
the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, is declared
illegal.
26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1958).
9 United States v. American Medical Ass'n, supra note 4, at 707.
10 Id. at 711. However, the United States Supreme Court found it unnecessary to
decide the question of whether or not the practice of medicine and the rendering of
medical services are "trade" under §, 3 of the Sherman Act. American Medical Ass'n v.
United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
11 Elizabeth Hosp. Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 884 (1959) ; Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th
Cir. 1957) ; Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (101.11 Cir. 1952) ;
Robinson v. Lull, 145 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ill. 1956). In Oregon State Medical Soc'y v.
United States, 343 U.S. 326 (1952), the government charged violation of §§ 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act for conspiring to restrain and monopolize the business of providing
prepaid medical care in Oregon and to restrain competition between doctor-sponsored
prepaid medical plans in Oregon. Affirming the dismissal of the case by the District
Court, the Supreme Court not only grounded its decision on an absence of interstate
commerce activity, but also declared that the United States had failed to prove concert,
pointing up another difficulty of using the remedy of the anti-trust laws—the difficulty
of proving conspiracy. See The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and
Politics of Organized Medicine, supra note 5, at 1020.
12
 Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n, [1919] 1 K.B. 244.
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returns of members of the society. But it was on this very point of motive
that a judicial tribunal in a later case with similar facts came to an opposite
conclusion. In answer to the charge by a doctor who was expelled from the
British Medical Society that the rule which precluded members from con-
sulting with non-members was in restraint of trade, the Privy Council
reasoned that the object of the rule was "to keep up the discipline and
`morale' of the members of the association [in order] to protect and promote
its interests, though indirectly and as an entirely undesigned result some
injury may incidentally be sustained by the expelled member in 'the practice
of his profession." 13
This illustrates the problem of the medical society's split motives giving
many of its rules a Janus-faced complexion; it seeks at once to protect the
public and its members. 14
 On the other hand, the Council also based its
decision on a defense to typical restraint of trade actions, viz., one has a
right to pursue his trade in any way he sees fit, even to the extent of com-
bining with others to follow a common course of action "provided such
common course of action is undertaken with a single view to the interests of
the combining parties and not with a view to injure others.'"° Significantly,
the Council did not simply dismiss the case as not coming within the purview
of the traditional concept of restraint of trade, rather it accepted the prob-
lem as one covered by anti-monopoly law, but dismissed the appeal on the
ground that the society's rule was not an illegal restraint of trade.
Although some state courts have applied anti-monopoly law to certain
practices of medical organizations, these decisions are noteworthy as excep-
tions to the general rule. The obstacles which the states face are either lack
of anti-monopoly laws or an unwillingness on the part of courts to expand the
application afforded by these laws to situations not traditionally labeled
"trade.'" Proof of a conspiracy is just as imposing a stumbling block in
13 Thompson v. New South Wales Branch of British Medical Ass'n, [1924] A.C.
763 (Wales).
14 This dichotomy of motives is lucidly pointed up in 50 Yale L.J., supra note 4,
at 938:
AMA successes in raising the quality of medical education, practice, and care
are beyond question. However, in these endeavors it has acquired such power
over both public and practitioner that it can channel the development of
American medicine. Dangers inherent in such power are compounded by the
layman's ignorance of medical matters and the AMA's monopoly position as
spokesman for the profession. • . . The AMA is motivated both by obligations
to the public and loyalties to its own members.
Generally, this statement is equally applicable to British medical societies as well as
the medical organizations involved in the instant case, since these latter are intimately
connected with the local affiliate of the AMA.
15 Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, 118921 A.C. 25, as cited by Lord Parker in At-
torney General of Australia v. Adelaide S.S. Co., [1913] A.C. 781, 797 (Austral.).
16 "While Group Health [infra note 191 may stand as a model solution to prob-
lems in this branch of the law, it has been correctly noted that some states do not have
anti-monopoly laws, and few of those that do would be willing to construe the provi-
sions as broadly as did the Washington court in Group Health." Expulsion and Exclu-
sion from Hospital Practice and Organized Medical Societies, 15 Rutgers L. Rev. 327, 398
(1962).
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state courts, as it is in federal courts." Additionally, the tremendous influ-
ence organized medicine exercises over legislation presents a problem of
titanic proportions." Notwithstanding these impediments, an occasional
court has given relief to doctors who are being injured by prohibitive rules
of medical organizations. Notably, the leading state court decision in this
area is Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Soc'y, 19
handed down eleven years ago by the same court that decided the instant
case. In that case the court held it was in restraint of trade for the local
medical society, together with two medical organizations which it dominated,
to conspire to exclude from membership of the society any doctor who en-
gaged in "unauthorized" contract medicine practice. Exclusion from mem-
bership had the effect of depriving the non-member doctor of local hospital
privileges and of professionally ostracizing him from his brother physicians,
who were usually society members." The only "authorized" contract medi-
cine practice was that controlled by the society through its medical bureau
and medical corporation. The prime significance of this exhaustive opinion
lies in its thorough analysis of the anti-monopoly provision of its constitu-
tion,21 which was adopted from the common law. To constitute a monopoly,
the court said three elements must be found to exist: (1) a combination,
contract or other arrangement, (2) a "product" or "commodity," and (3) a
purpose to fix prices, limit production, or regulate the transportation of such
product or commodity. By adopting an extremely broad construction of the
constitutional language, the court found a "combination" in the unwritten
arrangement among the medical organization to preempt contract medicine,
a "product" in the supplied medical services, and a purpose to limit produc-
tion and fix prices by controlling the medical services offered on a contract
basis. This decision furnishes the foundation and rationale for the holding
17 The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and Politics in Organized
Medicine, supra note 5, at 1020.
18
 "The American Medical Association is • considered by some observers the most
powerful lobby in Washington. Measures apparently assured of passage have been
voted down, buried in committee, or substantially amended upon the announcement of
AMA disapproval." The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics
in Organized Medicine, supra note 5, at 955. "The medical societies also exert great
influence over medical legislation on the state and local levels. The 'enactment of
favored measures and the defeat of those opposed can usually be secured." Supra at 957.
"In many states, laws authorize state and local medical societies to appoint or
recommend members of regulatory bodies. AMA standards in medicine, education,
training, and practice are usually adopted by law. . . . Thus the political authority of
the state itself has in effect been delegated to organized medicine." Supra at 959.
Compare Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 176C (1958) in which the legislature authorizes
operation by a medical organization of medical service plans, but makes termination of
a physician's membership turn, inter alia, on his "failure to comply with the professional
code of ethics as accepted by organized medicine."
10 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
20 See generally, American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and Politics in
Organized Medicine, supra note 5, in which the means used by the AMA to profession-
ally ostracize a non-member physician is discussed. Some methods' include prohibiting
members from having consultations with him or referring patients to him and, through
AMA's influence in hospitals, restricting him from using certain hospitals either entirely
or for routine work.
21 Wash. Const. art. XI[, 22 (1889).
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in the main case. 22 Indeed, a court must accept the broad interpretation of
anti-monopoly laws which the Washington court expressed in Group Health
Coop. before it can arrive at a decision like the one reached in Hubbard.
Exemplifying the reluctance of state judicial tribunals to extend the
coverage of anti-monopoly laws is the recent case of Falcone v. Middlesex
County Medical Soc'y23 in which the court found inapplicable the state
antitrust statutes.24 In that case a doctor who was licensed to practice medi-
cine and surgery by the State Board of Medical Examiners was precluded
from joining the medical society (and thereby denied the use of the county
hospitals, among other essentials) because he did not meet AMA educa-
tional standards. 25 However, the court, in an unprecedented move, com-
pelled the society to admit him, holding the by-law which originally excluded
him to be against public policy. Although this case offers an alternative
approach to the problem at hand, it, too, represents a bold new move in a
direction away from traditional law, for private associations have always
been allowed to freely select their membership. 25
The decision in the instant case is a good example of how a state court
can avoid impairing the integrity of a highly useful and valuable organiza-
tion by not declaring the entire operation of the medical organizations
monopolistic, but, at the same time, condemn a particular practice which is
injurious to non-members and not beneficial to the public. It can readily
be seen that the case, though in the minority, has support in the English and
the federal courts, having the advantage over the federal courts of not
having to establish a connection with interstate commerce. Although there
are alternative solutions to the fundamental problem of the case, 27 the an-
22 The court does not even discuss the problem of whether or not medical services
can be the subject of a suit based on the theory of restraint of trade. It simply cites
its decision in Group Health Coop., supra note 19, apparently relying on its extensive
analysis of the problem therein.
23 62 N.J. Super, 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960), aff'd, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
24 "The New Jersey antitrust provisions apply solely to corporate mergers and
acquisitions. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14.3-10 (1939)." Judicially Compelled Admission to
Medical Societies: The Falcone Case, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1186 (1962).
25 .Actually, Doctor Falcone held the degrees of Doctor of Osteopathy and Doctor
of Medicine, but he had not studied for four years in a medical school approved by the
AMA.
20 One author, writing about nonprofit associations generally, recognized this point,
but also realistically appraised the iron grip some organizations have on their members:
Some associations have a strangle-hold upon their members through their
control of an occupation or of property which can ill be spared. In such there
is operative a policy in favor of relief against wrongful treatment.. .
Medical associations refuse to take in doctors with heretical views, and greatly
hamper their practice. When admission is unfairly refused to such associations,
the courts might sometimes advantageously give relief if they would enjoin
wrongful expulsions. Chafes, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for
Profit, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993, 1022 (1930).
27 Prosser suggests that a tort is committed when there is an interference with
"prospective advantage," analogizing this with interference with contractual relations.
However, one important element of this offense is ill will, a clear Intention to cause
injury to another, This would be difficult to show in the case of a practice of a medi-
cal organization which is designed to protect its members but incidentally operates to
229
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
swer suggested in Hubbard of broadening the anti-monopoly laws, once ac-
cepted, will provide a ready remedy for any ethical non-member doctor
feeling the force of organized medicine.
DANIEL J. JOHNEDIS
Trade Regulations—Robinson-Patman Act—Cost Justification Defense
to Discriminatory Prices.—United States v. Borden.'—Borden and Bow-
man Companies attempted to defend against a Section 2(a) Clayton Act 2
suit by use of the cost justification proviso which allows price differentials if
they "make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered." Respondents
had admittedly discriminated between independently owned grocery stores
and grocery chain stores by allowing the latter group a higher flat discount
than the highest volume discount allowed to independents. 3 The District
Court allowed the defense and dismissed the injunction,4 but on appeal
the Supreme Court reversed. HELD: The class cost justifications did not
satisfy the burden of proving that the discriminatory prices reflected only
a "due allowance" for cost differences.
The proviso in Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Acts permitting
justification of price differential related to the seller's costs stems from a
comparable provision in Section 2 of the original Clayton Act. The 1936
Robinson-Patman amendments to the Clayton Act attempted to strike a
balance between protection of the small merchant from arbitrary and
the detriment of non-members. Furthermore, the court may still be confronted with
precedent which has limited this type cause of action to traditionally commercial
activities. Prosser, The Law of Torts 748 (2d ed. 195.5).
Remedial legislation does not appear to offer a realistic solution in view of the
potent political power organized medicine wields. Supra note 18.
Perhaps the only effective non-judicial answer to the problem is that offered by
Chafee:
When an association has a strangle-hold upon an individual or occupation,
internal decisions upon other questions besides expulsion and admission may
be of much public concern, ... However, the courts have usually refused to
interfere in such internal questions, and perhaps public opinion is a better
method for obtaining fair proceedings. Chaffee, supra note 26, at 1023.
1 370 U.S. 460 (1962).
2 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1961 Supp.),
(Robinson-Patman Act). The suit is referred to as a Clayton Act suit even though the
specific defense and subject of this note is the cost justification proviso introduced as
the Robinson-Patman amendment.
3 Borden Company allowed percentage discounts based on volume on a sliding
scale basis up to a maximum of 4%. The chain stores, however, were given flat discounts
up to simfo. Bowman Company had a similar arrangement allowing volume discounts
up to 8% and flat discounts to chains of 11%.
4 The District Court opinion is unreported. The litigants have been involved in
the controversy for nearly twelve years; for this earlier history involving the Clayton
and Sherman Acts, see: United States v. Borden, 111 F. Supp. 562 (1953) ; United States
v. Borden, 347 U.S. 514 (1954).
R Supra note 2.
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